KDP İRAN’A ‘TESLİM’ Mİ OLDU?

The first paragraph discusses Nechirvan Barzani's official two-day visit to Iran, where he held high-level talks. Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan region, declared a new phase in relations between the Kurdistan region, specifically Erbil, and Iran. The visit is significant for the regional dynamics, particularly concerning the relations between Erbil, the Kurdistan region, and Tehran. The primary reason for the visit was the necessity of parliamentary elections in Southern Kurdistan, which have been postponed for two years and were due in October 2022. The KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) is pushing for the postponement of the elections scheduled for June 10th. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court's decision to reduce the parliamentary seats from 111 to 100 has caused discontent among the KDP, leading them to announce a boycott of the elections. The KDP's discomfort with the election process and the economic crisis, which has affected the payment of salaries to Peshmerga forces and teachers, influenced their decision not to participate in the elections. The paragraph concludes with Barzani's return from Baghdad empty-handed, leaving them with the option to turn to Iran.

The second paragraph delves into the KDP's reliance on Turkey for support against Iran and Baghdad. It discusses the KDP's belief that Turkey would protect their interests. However, the paragraph highlights that Turkey cannot provide protection against both Iran and Baghdad simultaneously. The KDP's stance has led to a complex situation, with the party facing challenges from both Baghdad and Iran. The paragraph also touches upon the KDP's decision to boycott the elections, the potential outcomes of such a decision, and the broader implications for the region's politics, including the impact on the relations between Turkey, Iran, and the United States. It concludes with the KDP opening a new chapter in its political approach, with Barzani's visit to Iran marking a significant shift in regional dynamics.

The third paragraph focuses on the KDP's dilemma in balancing its relationships with Iran, Turkey, and the United States. It discusses the KDP's need to make concessions to Iran, which may include agreeing to certain demands to open a new chapter in their relationship. The paragraph also touches upon the Development Corridor project, which has caused discomfort for Iran due to its implications for the region's balance of power. The KDP's position on this project and its broader regional policy are highlighted, with an emphasis on the need for the KDP to navigate complex political dynamics. The paragraph concludes with a reference to the 1990s and the historical relations and conflicts between the KDP and other Kurdish leaders, drawing parallels to the current situation.

The fourth paragraph discusses the struggle for influence in the region, particularly focusing on Turkey's involvement and the potential loss of strategic advantages for Iran in the Hormuz Strait. It highlights Turkey's discomfort with the KDP's close ties with Iran and the potential impact on regional relations. The paragraph also touches upon the KDP's need to make certain concessions, particularly concerning the Development Corridor project. It concludes with a note on the KDP's future stance and actions, suggesting that the party will need to reassess its policies and relationships in the coming days.