AI Cognition Won't Work for Consciousness | Ned Block | Talks at Google
TLDRNed Block discusses the hard problem of consciousness, distinguishing between phenomenal and access consciousness. He argues for the richness of conscious perception, contrasting it with sparse cognition, and suggests that understanding these differences is crucial for advancements in artificial intelligence and neuroscience.
Takeaways
- 🧠 The 'hard problem' of consciousness refers to understanding why certain brain processes give rise to particular experiences, rather than others.
- 🌟 Ned Block distinguishes between 'phenomenal consciousness' (what it's like to have an experience) and 'access consciousness' (the global availability of information in an experience).
- 🔍 Block argues that phenomenal consciousness is better approached through biological methods rather than computational ones, which are more suited to access consciousness.
- 🧩 The debate between 'sparse' and 'rich' perception is discussed, with Block advocating for the richness of conscious perception.
- 🎯 Sperling's experiment on partial report superiority suggests that our phenomenal awareness has a greater capacity than what we can explicitly report.
- 🚫 The phenomenon of change blindness demonstrates that people often fail to notice significant changes in their visual field when their attention is diverted.
- 💡 Block suggests that what we fail to notice is not due to a lack of perception, but a lack of conceptualization of the perceived features.
- 🧬 The discussion touches on the role of memory in consciousness, differentiating between iconic memory (with phenomenology) and working memory (as a cognitive workspace).
- 🧠 The global workspace theory of consciousness, proposed by Stanislas Dehaene, is contrasted with Block's view, with recent experiments supporting Block's perspective.
- 👶 Block references experiments with babies to illustrate the non-conceptual nature of early conscious experiences, such as color perception.
- 🤖 The potential for machines to possess consciousness is considered, with Block suggesting that while we are conscious machines, the approach to machine consciousness may need to account for analog processes.
Q & A
What is the 'hard problem of consciousness' that Ned Block discusses?
-The 'hard problem of consciousness' refers to the issue of why the brain basis of a given experience is the brain basis of that experience as opposed to another experience or none. It questions why certain neural processes are associated with specific conscious experiences rather than others.
What is the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness?
-Phenomenal consciousness is about the subjective experience or 'what it's like' to have an experience, such as seeing a color or feeling pain. Access consciousness, on the other hand, is about the global availability of information in an experience, which is the domain of the 'easy problems' of consciousness that involve the function and interaction of conscious experiences with other mental states and behaviors.
Why does Ned Block argue that phenomenal consciousness is better approached through biological approaches rather than computer approaches?
-Ned Block suggests that phenomenal consciousness seems to involve aspects that are not just about information processing, but also biochemical mechanisms in the brain. These aspects might require analog processes that are not as easily replicated in digital or computational systems.
What is the concept of 'sparse' versus 'rich' perception in the context of the debate Block is discussing?
-Sparse perception refers to the view that our conscious perception only holds a limited amount of information, often associated with working memory's capacity. Rich perception, on the other hand, suggests that our conscious experience encompasses a much larger amount of information, contrary to the limitations seen in working memory.
What is the significance of the experiment conducted by George Sperling in understanding the 'richness' of consciousness?
-George Sperling's experiment demonstrated 'partial report superiority,' showing that participants could report details from a briefly presented array of characters that exceeded their normal working memory capacity when cued. This suggests that our conscious perception holds more information than we can immediately report, indicating a 'richness' to our conscious experience.
How does the 'inattentional blindness' versus 'inattentional inaccessibility' debate relate to the discussion on consciousness?
-The 'inattentional blindness' view suggests that people do not consciously see the features that change when their attention is diverted, implying a sparse view of consciousness. In contrast, 'inattentional inaccessibility' posits that people do see the changing features but fail to conceptualize them at a level that would allow them to notice the change, suggesting a richer form of conscious perception that is not fully accessed due to lack of attention.
What is the 'global workspace theory' of consciousness proposed by Stanislas Dehaene?
-The 'global workspace theory' suggests that consciousness arises when information from various sensory inputs becomes integrated and broadcasted to a wide network of brain regions, particularly the frontal lobes, allowing for the information to be conceptualized and used in various cognitive tasks.
How does Block's view of consciousness differ from the 'global workspace theory'?
-Block argues for a view where rich conscious perception exists independently of the global workspace and is not solely dependent on the integration and broadcasting of information to the frontal lobes. He suggests that phenomenal consciousness can occur without the need for global broadcasting, challenging the idea that consciousness is tied to the widespread activation of brain regions as proposed by the global workspace theory.
What is the significance of the 'no report' method in studying consciousness?
-The 'no report' method is significant because it allows researchers to study conscious perception without relying on subjective reports from participants. By using measures like eye movements or event-related potentials, researchers can gain insights into what a subject is consciously experiencing without the influence of cognitive processes involved in reporting and introspection.
How does Block's discussion on consciousness relate to the development of artificial intelligence?
-Block's discussion suggests that standard computational approaches to artificial intelligence may not fully capture the richness of phenomenal consciousness. He implies that for machines to achieve a form of consciousness similar to humans, they might require analog processes or mechanisms that go beyond the digital information processing currently employed in AI.
What is the implication of Block's view on consciousness for the study of animal consciousness?
-Block's view suggests that animals, especially primates, may have rich conscious experiences similar to humans. His emphasis on non-conceptual, phenomenal consciousness implies that animals can have subjective experiences even if they do not possess language or the ability to report their experiences verbally.
Outlines
🤔 Introduction to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Ned Block begins the discussion by addressing the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which concerns why certain brain processes give rise to specific experiences rather than others. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness (what it's like to have an experience) and access consciousness (the global availability of information in an experience). Block critiques the idea that these two aspects of consciousness are identical, suggesting that computational approaches may not be sufficient to understand phenomenal consciousness, which he believes has a biological basis.
🧐 Sparse vs. Rich Perception and the Role of Cognition
The talk continues with Block exploring the debate between sparse and rich perception. He argues that conscious perception is rich, contrary to the view that it is sparse and limited by working memory capacity. Block introduces George Sperling's experiment, which demonstrates 'partial report superiority,' suggesting that our phenomenal awareness holds more information than we can report. This, he claims, indicates the richness of our conscious experience as opposed to our cognitive capacity, which is more limited.
👀 The Phenomenon of Inattentional Blindness and Inaccessibility
Block delves into the phenomena of inattentional blindness and inaccessibility, using various visual experiments to illustrate how changes in a scene can go unnoticed. He differentiates between not seeing changes due to lack of attention (sparse view) and seeing but not conceptualizing them (rich view). Block supports the rich view, arguing that we are consciously aware of more than we can report or conceptualize, and that attention and conceptualization play crucial roles in what we consciously experience.
🌈 The Development of Color Perception in Infants
Block discusses the development of color perception in infants, noting that while babies can discriminate colors at a young age, they do not use color in reasoning until later. This, he suggests, indicates that their color perception is non-conceptual. Block uses this as evidence for his view that conscious experience is non-conceptual at its most fundamental level, and that conceptualization is a separate cognitive process that may not be essential for consciousness itself.
💡 Methodological Breakthroughs in Understanding Consciousness
In the final part of the talk, Block highlights recent methodological breakthroughs in the study of consciousness. He discusses experiments using binocular rivalry and optokinetic nystagmus to measure conscious perception without relying on reports. Block emphasizes that these studies support the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, suggesting that the former does not require global broadcasting in the brain, which is associated with the latter.
🤖 The Implications for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Consciousness
Block addresses the implications of his views on consciousness for artificial intelligence. He suggests that while AI may excel at模拟 access consciousness, which involves information flow and can be implemented on a machine, it may struggle to replicate phenomenal consciousness, which seems to involve more analog, biochemical processes in the brain. Block also discusses the possibility of machine consciousness, noting that while we are conscious machines ourselves, the application of theoretical approaches to consciousness in machines has not yet been successful.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Consciousness
💡Hard Problem
💡Phenomenal Consciousness
💡Access Consciousness
💡Sparse vs. Rich Perception
💡Inattentional Blindness
💡Global Workspace Theory
💡Binocular Rivalry
💡Neuroscience
💡Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Highlights
Ned Block discusses the hard problem of consciousness, which questions why the brain basis of a given experience is that experience.
Block differentiates between 'easy problems' of consciousness, such as function and interaction with other mental states, and the 'hard problem' which pertains to the nature of subjective experience.
He argues that phenomenal consciousness is better approached through biological methods rather than computational ones, suggesting a distinction between computational access and phenomenal experience.
Block introduces the concept of 'sparse' versus 'rich' perception, suggesting that conscious perception is rich and cognition is sparse.
The 'partial report superiority' experiment by George Sperling is mentioned as evidence for the richness of conscious perception.
Block discusses the phenomenon of 'inattentional blindness' and 'inattentional inaccessibility', highlighting the difference between not seeing changes and not conceptualizing them.
He presents the idea that noticing changes in a visual scene is easier when one conceptualizes the features involved.
Block challenges the global workspace theory, which posits that conscious experience involves the broadcasting of information to various cognitive processes.
He suggests that rich conscious perception does not require global broadcasting and is supported by recent neuroscience experiments.
Block discusses the role of memory in consciousness, distinguishing between iconic memory and working memory.
He presents an experiment with 12-month-old babies to illustrate the non-conceptual nature of early conscious experiences.
Block addresses the potential of artificial intelligence in understanding or replicating consciousness, suggesting that standard computational approaches may not suffice.
He discusses the possibility that analog processes, rather than digital ones, might be necessary to replicate phenomenal consciousness in machines.
Block touches on the evolution of consciousness, mentioning that while there are many hypotheses, the true reason for its existence remains unknown.
He concludes that consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness, may be resistant to computer approaches and might involve unique biochemical mechanisms in the brain.
